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Abstract
In this paper we consider the notion of quantum entanglement from the perspective of the logos
categorical approach [13, 14]. In [16] we argued that the widespread distinction between separable
states and entangled states is completely superfluous from a purely mathematical perspective. In
this paper we attempt to discuss how the logos approach is able to provide not only an objective
formal account of the notion of entanglement —completely independent of separability— in
terms of potential coding. For this purpose we will introduce the necessary distinction between
intensive relations and effective relations. Finally we will argue that our logos redefinition of
entanglement allows to provide an anschaulich content to this supposedly “spooky” quantum
relational feature.
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1 Entanglement: Under the Shadow of ‘Outcomes’ and ‘Particles’
In the sixties Karl Popper, one of the major figures within the field of epistemology and philosophy
of science wrote in Conjectures and Refutations [34] that the realist account of physics —the idea
that physical theories make reference to physis (nature or reality)— had been defeated. “Today the
view of physical science founded by Osiander, Cardinal Bellarmino, and Bishop Berkeley, has won
the battle without another shot being fired. Without any further debate over the philosophical issue,
without producing any new argument, the instrumentalist view (as I shall call it) has become an
accepted dogma. It may well now be called the ‘official view’ of physical theory since it is accepted
by most of our leading theorists of physics (although neither by Einstein nor by Schro¨dinger).
And it has become part of the current teaching of physics.” Popper argued in his book that
there existed two main reasons for having reached this difficult situation. One of the reasons was
∗This paper is an extended version of the arguments and definitions presented in the second part of [15].
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the impact of Bohr’s interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (QM) in the physics community. “In
1927 Niels Bohr, one of the greatest thinkers in the field of atomic physics, introduced the so-
called principle of complementarity into atomic physics, which amounted to a ‘renunciation’ of the
attempt to interpret atomic theory as a description of anything.” But while pointing his finger to
Bohr, the neo-Kantian, Popper seems to have overlooked the deep influence of his own tradition
within the instrumentalist path. In fact, logical and empirical positivism —just like Bohr— had
also shifted the center of analysis from the theory to the subject, from thought to experience, from
explanation to prediction. Positivism was born from a riot against Kantian metaphysics and its a
priori concepts. The revolution had begun through an attack commanded by Ernst Mach to the
Kantian forms of intuition founded explicitly in Newtonian classical space and time. The criticisms
produced by positivism to Newton’s space-time physics and atomist metaphysics at the end of the
19th Century might be regarded as the very condition of possibility for the creation of the two main
physical theories of the 20th Century, namely, Relativity and QM. However, Mach’s ideas regarding
physics —which understood the discipline as an economy of experience (or observations)—, even
though allowed to expand the limits of the theoretical consideration of experience —beyond classical
space-time— also contained within the seed of instrumentalism itself.
The other reason mentioned by Popper for the triumph of instrumentalism makes explicit use
of a pragmatic viewpoint stressing the “the spectacular practical success of [quantum mechanical]
applications.” According to Popper: “Instead of results due to the principle of complementarity
other and more practical results of atomic theory were obtained, some of them with a big bang. No
doubt physicists were perfectly right in interpreting these successful applications as corroborating
their theories. But strangely enough they took them as confirming the instrumentalist creed.”
The deep influence of positivism within QM cannot be underestimated. Maybe one the most
important points of this decisive influence —apparently overlooked within the literature— was the
introduction of the projection postulate. This postulate was required in order to support one of the
main cornerstones of positivism, namely, the idea that ‘physical theories describe the observations
of subjects (or agents)’. The famous postulate, interpreted as a “collapse” of the quantum wave
function, scrambled the objective theoretical representation together with the subjective observation
of single ‘clicks’ in detectors. In turn, this addition —completely foreign to the quantum formalism—
ended up creating the infamous measurement problem in which the literature has been stuck for
almost a century [7]. But maybe the strangest aspect of this story —a kind of joke from destiny—
was that, turning against itself, very soon positivism accepted as a self evident “common sense”
given the atomist space-time Newtonian metaphysics it had fought and defeated just a few decades
before.
The “scrambling” of objective and subjective elements with quantum theory was clearly ad-
dressed by Jaynes:
“[O]ur present [quantum mechanical] formalism is not purely epistemological; it is a peculiar
mixture describing in part realities of Nature, in part incomplete human information about
Nature —all scrambled up by Heisenberg and Bohr into an omelette that nobody has seen how
to unscramble. Yet we think that the unscrambling is a prerequisite for any further advance
in basic physical theory. For, if we cannot separate the subjective and objective aspects of the
formalism, we cannot know what we are talking about; it is just that simple.” [30, p. 381]
Just like in the case of other notions used within the theory of quanta, entanglement did not escape
the scrambling. As we argued extensively in [16], the metaphysical prejudices regarding the refer-
ence of the theory combined with the emphasis of prediction over theoretical representation also
reached the 1935 Schro¨dinger’s definition of quantum entanglement. Firstly, through the unjustified
presupposition that QM makes reference to our “common sense” (metaphysical) picture —grounded
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on Newtonian space-time atomism— of “small particles” and consequently, that an analysis which
considers separability as a standpoint is justified. And secondly, through the —implicit— applica-
tion of the positivist idea that QM makes reference to certain (actual) predictions of measurement
outcomes (or observations) and consequently, that the notion of “collapse” and “pure state” must be
regarded as fundamental cornerstone of any definition. This construction of entanglement founded
on a very weak metaphysical pillars —completely unrelated to the mathematical formalism— has
lead to many difficulties. Firstly, the definition of entanglement is purely negative, contra-posed to
the notion of separability. That which is not separable is entangled. Secondly, this definition only
works with pure states, but not with mixtures. It is a difficult problem to determine if a mixed
state is separable or not. Thirdly, there seems to exist also within the notion of entanglement a
strange scrambling of objective correlations with subjective knowledge. A problem that Einstein
and Schro¨dinger made explicit already in 1935. Finally, it is not really clear what quantum en-
tanglement really means since the “common sense” Newtonian explanation in terms of particles
seems to crash with the orthodox formalism of the theory. In this article we attempt to provide an
objective definition of quantum entanglement which is grounded on the orthodox formalism of QM
alone without making any metaphysical presupposition. But before doing so let us briefly recall one
of the main problems in which the orthodox definition of entanglement is still immersed in.
2 The Entanglement of Systems and Subjective Knowledge
The notion of entanglement was introduced by Erwin Schro¨dinger in a series of three papers during
the years of 1935 and 1936 [36, 37, 38] which continued the reflections regarding the EPR Gedanken-
experiment [26]. In the first paper of the series, Discussion of Probability Relations Between Sepa-
rated Systems, he begins right from the start by defining the physical meaning of entanglement in
terms of interacting systems.
“When two systems, of which we know the states by their respective representatives, enter into
temporary physical interaction due to known forces between them, and when after a time of
mutual influence the systems separate again, then they can no longer be described in the same
way as before, viz. by endowing each of them with a representative of its own. I would not
call that one but rather the characteristic trait of quantum mechanics, the one that enforces its
entire departure from classical lines of thought. By the interaction the two representatives (or
ψ-functions) have become entangled.” [37, p. 555]
Immediately after, Schro¨dinger continues to explain how to disentangle the two systems through
measurement:
“To disentangle them we must gather further information by experiment, although we knew
as much as anybody could possibly know about all that happened. Of either system, taken
separately, all previous knowledge may be entirely lost, leaving us but one privilege: to restrict
the experiments to one only of the two systems. After reestablishing one representative by
observation, the other one can be inferred simultaneously. In what follows the whole of this
procedure will be called the disentanglement. Its sinister importance is due to its being involved in
every measuring process and therefore forming the basis of the quantum theory of measurement,
threatening us thereby with at least a regressus in infinitum, since it will be noticed that the
procedure itself involves measurement.”[37, p. 555]
Schro¨dinger is making reference here to the famous “spooky action at a distance” according to which
the measurement —and subsequent collapse— of one physical quantity in one of the systems seems
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to influence the definite value of the same physical quantity in the other distant system. Making
explicit reference to the EPR paper, Schro¨dinger remarks that:
“Attention has recently [26] been called to the obvious but very disconcerting fact that even
though we restrict the disentangling measurements to one system, the representative obtained
for the other system is by no means independent of the particular choice of observations which
we select for that purpose and which by the way are entirely arbitrary. It is rather discomforting
that the theory should allow a system to be steered or piloted into one or the other type of state
at the experimenter’s mercy in spite of his having no access to it.”[37, p. 555-556]
Following the reality criteria proposed in the EPR paper, Schro¨dinger also assumed —implicitly—
that maximal knowledge had to be understood as certain knowledge; i.e., as restricted to knowledge
that involves probability equal to unity. As he remarks, the astonishing aspect of QM is that when
two systems get entangled through a known interaction, the knowledge we have of the parts might
anyhow decrease.
“If two separated bodies, each by itself known maximally, enter a situation in which they influ-
ence each other, and separate again, then there occurs regularly that which I have just called
entanglement of our knowledge of the two bodies. The combined expectation-catalog consists
initially of a logical sum of the individual catalogs; during the process it develops causally in
accord with known law (there is no question of measurement here). The knowledge remains
maximal, but at the end, if the two bodies have again separated, it is not again split into a
logical sum of knowledges about the individual bodies. What still remains of that may have
become less than maximal, even very strongly so.—One notes the great difference over against
the classical model theory, where of course from known initial states and with known interaction
the individual states would be exactly known.”[36, p. 161]
At this point it becomes evident how the projection postulate interpreted as a real collapse of the
quantum wave function ends up scrambling —just like in the case of the measurement process—
the objective theoretical representation provided by the mathematical formalism and the subjective
observation of a particular ‘click’ in the lab. The entanglement of systems and outcomes within
the same representation determines then the scrambling of the objective knowledge, related to the
theory, and the subjective knowledge, related to the purely epistemic process of measurement.
3 In Search of Theoretical Objectivity
Albert Einstein understood very clearly the importance of what he called “detachedness” of par-
ticular subjects (or agents) within the objective representation of physical theories. Objectivity in
this case did not refer to the observations of measurement outcomes by subjects (or agents), but
—on the very contrary— to the representation provided by the theory.1 As repeatedly stressed by
Einstein, the scrambling of an (objective) theoretical representation and the (subjective) account
of observations was completely unacceptable to him. The reason is simple: this scrambling implied
the idea that nature was not something independent of subjects, but on the contrary, something
1It should be remarked that even though this notion of objectivity relates directly its original reference to an object
as a moment of unity; it differs drastically from its contemporary mainstream Bohrian and positivist understanding of
objectivity as the intersubjective account of observations or —even— as referring to the choices and decisions of agents
[21, 23]. For example, following this line of thought, Healey remarks in a recent paper [27]: “Quantum theory is taken
to be fundamental to contemporary physics in large part because countless measurements have yielded outcomes that
conform to its predictions. Experimenters take great care to ensure that each quantum measurement has an outcome
that is not just a subjective impression but an objective, physical event.”
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entangled and dependent on the will and decisions of conscious human beings. This might be the
most important point of disagreement with Bohr, who had willingly accepted the idea that mea-
surements played an essential role within the theory and repeated to everyone who was willing to
listen to him that the most important lesson to be learnt from QM was an epistemological one,
namely, that we subjects are not only spectators but also actors in the great drama of (quantum)
existence. As recalled by Pauli, Einstein did not agree with this point which drastically changed
the fundaments and reference of physics itself.
“[...] it seems to me quite appropriate to call the conceptual description of nature in classical
physics, which Einstein so emphatically wishes to retain, ‘the ideal of the detached observer’.
To put it drastically the observer has according to this ideal to disappear entirely in a discrete
manner as hidden spectator, never as actor, nature being left alone in a predetermined course of
events, independent of the way in which phenomena are observed. ‘Like the moon has a definite
position’ Einstein said to me last winter, ‘whether or not we look at the moon, the same must
also hold for the atomic objects, as there is no sharp distinction possible between these and
macroscopic objects. Observation cannot create an element of reality like position, there must
be something contained in the complete description of physical reality which corresponds to the
possibility of observing a position, already before the observation has been actually made’.” [31,
p. 60]
The intromission of subjects within the description of nature was also criticized by Spinoza in the
XVII Century, Einstein’s favorite philosopher. Spinoza had criticized those who believed that man
is an empire within an empire. Subjects are within nature, and regardless of their self-esteem they
are not “special” existents. Nature simply does not care what human subjects do. In the same
spirit, Einstein —who believed in the God of Spinoza, i.e. in nature— is quoted by Everett [32, p.
7] to have said that he “could not believe that a mouse could bring about drastic changes in the
universe simply by looking at it”. He also shared his concerns with Scho¨dinger to whom he wrote
[35, p. 39]: “Most [physicists] simply do not see what sort of risky game they are playing with
reality —reality is something independent or what is experimentally established.”
In line with Einstein, the kernel of representational realism (as presented in [6, 7]) is that
physical theories represent reality through the creation of interrelated mathematical-conceptual
schemes which allow us to provide a quantitive and qualitative meaning and understanding to the
unity of experience. According to representational realism, physical representation comes before
any other consideration regarding the very possibility of physical analysis.
The notion of ‘physical object’ —one of the most important creations of thought— is also
part of a specific representation. This physical representation has been developed both formally
and conceptually since Aristotle to Newton. The notion of ‘object’ provides the moment of unity
which through counterfactual reasoning and discourse allows us to make sense of multiple physical
phenomena; it is not a self-evident “natural existent” of reality which is waiting to be observed.
The meaning of objectivity is thus related to the possibility of creating representations which,
on the one hand, unify multiple experiences coherently, and on the other, are independent —or
‘detached’— from the actions and choices of particular subjects. Since there is no moment of unity
before providing the conditions of objective representation, science can only begin its analysis of
experience from the standpoint of representation itself. Or in other words, any scientific discourse
must always presuppose a conceptual account of what is meant by a ‘state of affairs’. This is not
—at least for the realist— something “self evident” nor part of the “common sense” of the layman
but the very precondition for understanding phenomena in a scientific manner. It is the recognition
of the need of representation which allows science to be critical about its own foundation. In this
respect, we might recall Einstein’s remark to Heisenberg that: “It is only the theory which decides
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what can be observed.” This, in fact, was according to Einstein, the really significant philosophical
achievement of Kant:
“From Hume Kant had learned that there are concepts (as, for example, that of causal connec-
tion), which play a dominating role in our thinking, and which, nevertheless, can not be deduced
by means of a logical process from the empirically given (a fact which several empiricists rec-
ognize, it is true, but seem always again to forget). What justifies the use of such concepts?
Suppose he had replied in this sense: Thinking is necessary in order to understand the empiri-
cally given, and concepts and ‘categories’ are necessary as indispensable elements of thinking.”
[25, p. 678] (emphasis in the original)
Willingly or not, we physicists, are always producing our praxis within a specific representation.
Representation is always first, experience and perception are necessarily second. Paraphrasing
Wittgenstein’s famous remark regarding language, the physical representation we inhabit presents
the limits of the physical world we understand.2 This marks a point of departure with respect to
naive empiricism and positivism, which was also stressed by Einstein:
“I dislike the basic positivistic attitude, which from my point of view is untenable, and which
seems to me to come to the same thing as Berkeley’s principle, esse est percipi. ‘Being’ is always
something which is mentally constructed by us, that is, something which we freely posit (in the
logical sense). The justification of such constructs does not lie in their derivation from what is
given by the senses. Such a type of derivation (in the sense of logical deducibility) is nowhere
to be had, not even in the domain of pre-scientific thinking. The justification of the constructs,
which represent ‘reality’ for us, lies alone in their quality of making intelligible what is sensorily
given.” [25, p. 669]
The naive empiricist viewpoint according to which there can be a “direct access” to the world
that surround us by “simply observing what is going on” was fantastically addressed —and ironically
criticized— by the Argentine Jorge Luis Borges in a beautiful short story called Funes the memorious
[3]. Borges recalls his encounter with Ireneo Funes, a young man from Fray Bentos who after
having an accident become paralyzed. Since then Funes’ perception and memory became infallible.
According to Borges, the least important of his recollections was more minutely precise and more
lively than our perception of a physical pleasure or a physical torment. However, as Borges also
remarked: “He was, let us not forget, almost incapable of general, platonic ideas. It was not only
difficult for him to understand that the generic term dog embraced so many unlike specimens of
differing sizes and different forms; he was disturbed by the fact that a dog at three-fourteen (seen in
profile) should have the same name as the dog at three fifteen (seen from the front). [...] Without
effort, he had learned English, French, Portuguese, Latin. I suspect, however, that he was not very
capable of thought. To think is to forget differences, generalize, make abstractions. In the teeming
world of Funes there were only details, almost immediate in their presence.”3 Using the story as a
Gedankenexperiment Borges shows why, for a radical empiricist like Funes, there is no reason why
2Let us notice, firstly, that “physical” should not be understood as a given “material reality”, but rather as a
procedure for representing reality in theoretical —both formal and conceptual— terms. And secondly, that the relation
between such physical representation and reality is not something “self evident”. The naive realist account according
to which representation “discovers” an already “fixed” reality is not the only possibility that can be considered. A
one-to-one correspondence relation between theory and reality is a very naive solution to the deep problem of relating
theory and physis.
3The problem exposed by Borges is in fact, the same problem which positivists like Carnap, Nagel, Popper between
many others tried to resolve without any success: the difficult relation between, on the one hand, phenomenological
experience or observations, and on the other, concepts and theories. An interesting detailed and historical recognition
of the many failures of this positivist project is [29, Chap. 8].
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to assume a metaphysical identity between ‘the dog at three-fourteen (seen in profile)’ and ‘the dog
at three fifteen (seen from the front)’. For Funes —the radical empiricist capable of apprehending
experience beyond conceptual presuppositions— there is no ‘dog’, simply because experience does
not contain the moment of unity required to make reference to the same through time. “Locke, in
the seventeenth century, postulated (and rejected) an impossible language in which each individual
thing, each stone, each bird and each branch, would have its own name; Funes once projected an
analogous language, but discarded it because it seemed too general to him, too ambiguous. In fact,
Funes remembered not only every leaf of every tree of every wood, but also every one of the times
he had perceived or imagined it.” Existence, identity, non-contradiction, are ontological principles
which provide the conceptual architectonic which allows us to connect the ‘the dog at three-fourteen
(seen in profile)’ and ‘the dog at three fifteen (seen from the front)’ in terms of a sameness. It is only
through these principles that we can think in terms of space-time systems —such as, for example,
a ‘dog’. Borges shows why these principles are not self-evident givens of experience, and neither
is a ‘dog’. And this is the reason why Borges also suspected that Funes “was not very capable of
thought.”
Going now back to quantum theory, the question that interests us is the following: Is it possible
to provide an objective account of the orthodox quantum formalism? Objective here should not be
understood as “a true reference to experience” (whatever that means), but as the formal-conceptual
preconditions under which we can represent a moment of unity, both in the mathematical level and
the conceptual discursive level, within a physical theory. It is, in fact, this moment of unity which
in turn allows for the famous detachment of the subject from the represented state of affairs. As
we argued in [12], in the case of the mathematical formalisms of physical theories the objective
elements are given in relation to the notion of invariance. If we consider the invariant structure
of the quantum formalism it is very easy to detect the ground for any objective consideration:
it is obviously the Born rule [5, 13]. What is not so easy of course, is to leave aside the deeply
grounded (metaphysical) understanding of physical reality in terms of ‘systems’ and ‘properties’
inhabiting space-time and the actual realm of existence. According to our viewpoint, this actualist
representation of physical reality —when attempting to discuss and analyze what QM is really
talking about— has played the role of an epistemological obstruction [11]. But if we stop trying
systematically to relate QM to binary existence, to systems and properties, if we take seriously
what the mathematical formalism is telling us, then we must accept —following the footsteps of
Wolfgang Pauli— that the theory is pointing to the very reconsideration of the way in which we
must represent physical reality in the context of the theory of quanta.
4 Logos Categorical QM: A Formal-Conceptual Approach
The logos approach to QM presented in [13, 14] is able to explain in a visualizable manner through
the use of graphs, how the objective character of the mathematical representation is restored when
replacing the orthodox partial binary valuations by a global intensive valuation. By introducing this
new type of existential quantification —grounded on the invariance of the Born rule— we were able,
in turn, to derive a Non-Contextuality Theorem which shows how to escape Kochen-Specker con-
textuality and restore an objective reading of the mathematical formalism. But our approach is not
only focused in the orthodox mathematical Hilbert scheme, it also stresses the need to supplement
the formalism with adequate physical concepts which must be able to provide an anschaulich content
and explanation of quantum phenomena.4 Thus, by developing new (non-classical) notions we hope
4The anschaulich aspect of physical theories was something repeatedly discussed by the founding fathers of QM.
More recently David Deutsch, taking distance from empiricists viewpoints which argue that theories are created from
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to explain in a new light the basic features already exposed by the formalism of QM. But before
addressing the notion of entanglement more in detail from the perspective of the logos approach to
QM, let us first provide a general introduction to its basic elements.
4.1 Beyond Actuality: Intensive Physical Reality and Objective Probability
As we have discussed in [13, 14], one of the main standpoints of the logos approach to QM is
that by developing a notion of physical reality beyond binary existence —imposed by the classical
representation (in terms of ‘systems’, ‘states’ and ‘properties’)—, it is in fact possible to provide a
coherent objective representation of QM. This can be done, without changing the orthodox Hilbert
formalism, without creating many unobservable worlds or introducing human consciousness within
the analysis. According to this viewpoint, there is a main hypothesis presupposed within EPR’s
line of reasoning and argumentation which is wrong in a fundamental manner. QM simply does not
describe an actual (separable) state of affairs. And it is the formalism itself which makes explicit
this fact —in many different ways— right from the start: Heisenberg’s indeterminacy principle, the
superposition principle, Kochen-Specker theorem, Gleason’s theorem, Born’s probability rule, they
are all “road signs” —as Pauli used to call them— that point in the direction of leaving behind the
classical actualist representation of physics in order to understand the theory of quanta.
It is argued today that physics can only describe ‘systems’ with definite ‘states’ and ‘properties’.
This encapsulation of reality in terms of the classical paradigm —mainly due to Bohr’s philosophy
of physics supplemented by 20th Century positivism— has blocked the possibility to advance in the
development of a new conceptual scheme. This is what David Deutsch [18] has rightly characterized
as “bad philosophy”; i.e., “[a] philosophy that is not merely false, but actively prevents the growth
of other knowledge.” Taking distance from the Bohrian prohibition to consider physical reality
beyond the theories of Newton and Maxwell, we have proposed the following extended definition of
what can be naturally considered —by simply taking into account the mathematical invariance of
Hilbert formalism— as a generalized element of (quantum) physical reality (see [5]).
Generalized Element of Physical Reality: If we can predict in any way (i.e., both probabilis-
tically or with certainty) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of reality
corresponding to that quantity.
As it will become clear, this redefinition implies a deep reconfiguration of the meaning of the
quantum formalism and the type of predictions it provides. It also allows to understand Born’s
probabilistic rule in a new light; not as providing information about a (subjective) measurement
result, but rather, as providing objective information of a theoretically described (potential) state
of affairs. Objective probability does not mean that particles behave in an intrinsically random
manner. Objective probability means that probability characterizes a feature of the conceptual
representation accurately and independently of any subjective choice. This account of probability
allows us to restore a representation in which the state of affairs is detached from the observer’s
choices to measure (or not) a particular property —just like Einstein desired5. This means that
observations, has stressed the importance of their explanatory aspect [18, 19].
5As recalled by Pauli [33, p. 122]: “Einstein’s opposition to [quantum mechanics] is again reflected in his papers
which he published, at first in collaboration with Rosen and Podolsky, and later alone, as a critique of the concept of
reality in quantum mechanics. We often discussed these questions together, and I invariably profited very greatly even
when I could not agree with Einstein’s view. ‘Physics is after all the description of reality’ he said to me, continuing,
with a sarcastic glance in my direction ‘or should I perhaps say physics is the description of what one merely imagines?’
This question clearly shows Einstein’s concern that the objective character of physics might be lost through a theory
of the type of quantum mechanics, in that as a consequence of a wider conception of the objectivity of an explanation
of nature the difference between physical reality and dream or hallucination might become blurred.”
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within our account of QM —contrary to the orthodox viewpoint—, the Born rule always provides
complete knowledge of the state of affairs described quantum mechanically; in cases where the
probability is equal to 1 and also in cases in which probability is different to 1. Or in other words,
both pure states and mixed states provide maximal knowledge of a (quantum) state of affairs. Since
there is no essential mathematical distinction, both type of states have to be equally considered;
none of them is “less real”, or “less well defined” than the other.
4.2 The Logos Categorical Formalism
Let us now recall some basic mathematical notions of our logos categorical approach. We assume
that the reader is familiar with the definition of a category. Following [13], let C be a category and
let C be an object in C. Let us define the category over C denoted C|C . Objects in C|C are given
by arrows to C, p : X → C, q : Y → C, etc. Arrows f : p→ q are commutative triangles,
X
f //
p   
Y
q
C
For example, let Sets|2 be the category of sets over 2, where 2 = {0, 1} and Sets is the category of
sets. Objects in Sets|2 are functions from a set to {0, 1} and morphisms are commuting triangles,
X
f //
p ""
Y
q||
{0, 1}
In the previous triangle, p and q are objects of Sets|2 and f is a function satisfying qf = p.
Our main interest is the category Gph|[0,1] of graphs over the interval [0, 1]. The category
Gph|[0,1] has very nice categorical properties [1, 24], and it is a logos. Let us begin by reviewing
some properties of the category of graphs. A graph is a set with a reflexive symmetric relation. The
category of graphs extends naturally the category of sets and the category of aggregates (objects
with an equivalence relation). A set is a graph without edges. An aggregate is a graph in which the
relation is transitive. More generally, we can assign to a category a graph, where the objects are
the nodes of the graph and there is an edge between A and B if hom(A,B) 6= ∅. Given that in a
category we have a composition law, the resulting graph is an aggregate.
Definition 4.1 We say that a graph G is complete if there is an edge between two arbitrary nodes.
A context is a complete subgraph (or aggregate) inside G. A maximal context is a context not
contained properly in another context. If we do not indicate the opposite, when we refer to contexts
we will be implying maximal contexts.
For example, let P1, P2 be two elements of a graph G. Then, {P1, P2} is a contexts if P1 is related to
P2, P1 ∼ P2. Saying differently, if there exists an edge between P1 and P2. In general, a collection
of elements {Pi}i∈I ⊆ G determine a context if Pi ∼ Pj for all i, j ∈ I. Equivalently, if the subgraph
with nodes {Pi}i∈I is complete.
Given a Hilbert space H, we can define naturally a graph G = G(H) as follows. Following [Op.
cit.] the nodes are interpreted as immanent powers and there exists an edge between P and Q if
and only if [P,Q] = 0. This relation makes G a graph (the relation is not transitive). We call this
relation quantum commuting relation.
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Theorem 4.2 Let H be a Hilbert space and let G be the graph of immanent powers with the com-
muting relation given by QM. It then follows that:
1. The graph G contains all the contexts.
2. Each context is capable of generating the whole graph G.
Proof: See [14]. 
As we mentioned earlier, an object in Gph|[0,1] consists in a map Ψ : G → [0, 1], where G is a
graph. Then, in order to provide a map to the graph of immanent powers, we use the Born rule.
To each power P ∈ G, we assign through the Born rule the number p = Ψ(P ), where p is a number
between 0 and 1 called potentia. As discussed in detail in [13], we call this map Ψ : G → [0, 1] a
Potential State of Affairs (PSA for short). Summarizing, we have the following:
Definition 4.3 Let H be Hilbert space and let ρ be a density matrix. Take G as the graph of
immanent powers with the quantum commuting relation. To each immanent power P ∈ G apply the
Born rule to get the number Ψ(P ) ∈ [0, 1], which is called the potentia (or intensity) of the power
P . Then, Ψ : G → [0, 1] defines an object in Gph|[0,1]. We call this map a Potential State of Affairs.
Intuitively, we can picture a PSA as a table,
Ψ : G(H)→ [0, 1], Ψ :

P1 → p1
P2 → p2
P3 → p3
...
The introduction of intensive valuations allows us to derive a non-contextuality theorem that is
able to escape Kochen-Specker contextuality [13]).
Theorem 4.4 The knowledge of a PSA Ψ is equivalent to the knowledge of the density matrix ρΨ.
In particular, if Ψ is defined by a normalized vector vΨ, ‖vΨ‖ = 1, then we can recover the vector
from Ψ.
Proof: See [14]. 
Notice that our mathematical representation is objective in the sense that it relates, in a coherent
manner and without internal contradictions, the multiple contexts (or aggregates) and the whole
PSA. Contrary to the contextual (relativist) Bohrian “complementarity solution”, there is in this
case no need of a (subjective) choice of a particular context in order to define the “physically
real” state of affairs. The state of affairs is described completely by the whole graph (or Ψ), and
the contexts bear an invariant (objective) existence independently of any (subjective) choice. Let
us remark that ‘objective’ is not understood as a synonym of ‘real’, but rather as providing the
conditions of a theoretical representation in which all subjects are detached from the course of
events. Contrary to Bohr’s claim, in our account of QM, individual subjects are not considered as
actors. Subjects are humble spectators and their choices do not change the objective representation
of the theory.
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4.3 New Non-Classical Concepts
Our approach seeks to understand quantum phenomena by introducing notions which are not only
capable to match the mathematical formalism in a natural manner, but also allow us to think
about what is really going on according to the theory of quanta in a new light. As we have argued
extensively [5, 7, 8, 9], it is the concept of immanent intensive power which seems particularly well
suited to describe what is going on according to the theory of quanta. Let us recall some important
features of our new conceptual scheme.
A immanent power, contrary to systems constituted by binary properties, has an intensive
existence. A power is always quantified in terms of a potentia which measures its strength. The way
to compute the potentia of each power is via the Born rule. Due to their invariant character, both
powers and potentia can be regarded as being objective, meaning, independent of the (subjective)
choice of any particular context. These notions allow us to escape the widespread Bohrian dogma
according to which we must simply accept that measurements in QM have a special status.6 The
Born rule is not anymore understood in epistemic terms, as making reference to the probability of
obtaining measurement outcomes. Instead, Born’s rule is now conceived as a way of computing an
objective feature of the (potential) state of affairs represented by QM. The rule provides a definite
value of the potentia of each power. The immanent cause allows us to argue that the single outcome
found in a measurement does not influence in any way the superposition as a whole: there is no
collapse, no physical process taking place. Instead, the finding of an outcome is simply the path
from an ontological description to an epistemic inquiry common to all physical theories (see [9]).
The intensive account of powers also allows us to escape Kochen-Specker type contextuality which
becomes in our scheme a purely epistemic feature, one that deals with the epistemic incompatibility
of quantum experiments, and not with the ontic incompatibility of quantum existents (see [10, 13]).
As in any other physical theory, within the logos approach, the consideration of quantum mea-
surements must be discussed independently of the mathematical formalism. The incomprehension
of QM begun when the notion of measurement was explicitly introduced within the mathematical
representation of the theory as an axiom (the projection postulate). It is this scrambling which
has lead QM into all sorts of paradoxes and inconsistencies. Above all, it is responsible for having
created the infamous measurement problem; a problem which has influenced in a decisive manner
all the research related to the theory of quanta.
5 A New Objective Path for Quantum Entanglement
Taking into account right from the start the well known non-classical features of the orthodox
quantum formalism, we might ask the following rhetorical questions:
• Why should we expect QM to be related to the classical representation inherited from space-
time Newtonian mechanics and the metaphysics of (unobservable) atoms?
• Why should we keep using classical notions such as ‘system’, ‘state’ and ‘property’, which
we already know very well don’t work at all in order to explain the orthodox mathematical
formalism?
6It is commonly argued that when we measure in QM, we always influence the quantum object under study —which
is just another way of making reference to the famous “collapse” of the quantum wave function. This idea, mainly
due to Bohr’s account of QM, implies that subjects define reality in an explicit manner; or as Bohr himself used to
say: “that in the great drama of [quantum] existence we are not only spectators but also actors.”
11
• Why should we accept the naive positivist notion of observability —and consequently, the
collapse of the quantum wave function— as a fundamental constraint in order to define physical
reality?
Independently of the answer to these questions, there are many hints coming from the founding
fathers which show a different path in order to develop QM beyond the classical (metaphysical)
representation of physics. It is by taking seriously both the critical analysis put forward by Einstein
and Schro¨dinger and the constructive conceptual approach suggested by Heisenberg’s and Pauli’s
writings, that we have chosen to confront the Bohrian prohibition of developing new conceptual
forms imposed by his doctrine of classical concepts and his reductionistic metaphysical presupposi-
tion according to which QM must be understood as a rational generalization of classical physics [2].
Up to now, quantum entanglement, following Bohr’s restrictions of (classical) language and experi-
ence, has been systematically understood in terms of “interacting elementary particles”. According
to the logos approach, what we need to do —above all— is to think in a truly different manner.
And this can be only done with the aid of a new conceptual scheme.
5.1 Beyond Spookiness, Particle Metaphysics and Collapses
In the history of science, many times, we physicists, have been confronted with “spooky situations”.
The “spookiness” always comes from the lack of understanding. Incomprehension of the unknown
is always frightening. Just to give an example between many, the phenomena of electricity and
magnetism were regarded as “magical” since the origin of humanity itself. Pieces of stone attracting
each other without any material contact can be indeed “spooky”, not to talk about lightnings coming
from the sky. Until one day physicists were finally able to create a theory called electromagnetism
which explained all these different phenomena. Physicists were even able to find out that these
apparently different phenomena could be quantified in terms of a unified mathematical formalism.
But it was only through the conceptual representation of ‘fields’, that we could finally grasp a deep
qualitative understanding of the phenomena. In the end, electricity and magnetism were two sides
of the same represented physical reality. Suddenly, the spookiness had disappeared.
Nobel laureate Steven Weinberg [39], when discussing about quantum entanglement, has argued
that: “What is surprising is that when you make a measurement of one particle you affect the state
of the other particle, you change its state!” This conclusion is indeed spooky, since we never observe
in our macroscopic world that objects behave in such a strange manner. A table (or chair) in one
place never affects the state of another distant table (or chair). If we do something to an object in
a region of space A, there will be no action produced on an object situated in a distant region B.
But we must also stress that Weinberg’s amazement is implicitly grounded on the —unjustified—
assumption that QM talks about “small particles”.
The metaphysical picture provided by atomist Newtonian mechanics is of course a very heavy
burden for today’s quantum physics. Newton’s metaphysical representation of the world has become
the “common sense” of our time. Advocated by many like a dogma that cannot be questioned, the
idea that QM talks about small particles has been introduced within the theory uncritically and
without any formal nor experimental support. Particle metaphysics plays today an essential role
in the discussion and debates about QM. Even though some researchers recognize the difficulties
of thinking in classical terms they seem always to forget when being actually confronted with the
problems and questions raised by the theory. However, the worst part of this situation comes from
those researchers who do not even acknowledge that the Newtonian atomist picture is a particular
metaphysical system, and not an “obvious” or “self evident” way to talk about reality. It is only
when we recognize the fact that physical theories imply a formal-conceptual representation that
an obvious question raises: could it be possible to create new concepts that would allow us to
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understand the phenomena implied by quantum entanglement in a manner which does not consider
“particles”, and which is not “spooky”? Just in the same way as we created the notion of ‘field’ in
order to account for the phenomena of electricity and magnetism, could it be possible to develop a
notion which is able to explain in an intuitive manner the quantum correlations that we encounter
when performing measurements in the lab?
As we have discussed above, that which is responsible for the “spookiness” is the acceptance
of two —unjustified— claims: first, the idea that QM talks about “small particles”; and second,
the existence of a “collapse” which takes superposed particles into single measurement outcomes.
Indeed, one does not find within the formal structure of QM a description or reference to ‘parti-
cles’ nor to any strange ‘collapse process’. On the one hand, the notion of particle rather than
helping understand quantum phenomena seems to have played the role of an epistemological ob-
struction [11]. On the other, the existence of collapses conflicts with the evolution governed by
the Schro¨dinger equation and introduces a new evolution within the theory dependent on the wit-
nessing of subjects. As remarked by Dieks [22, p. 120] the existence of such collapses has been
denied and “sophisticated experiments have clearly demonstrated that in interaction processes on
the sub-microscopic, microscopic and mesoscopic scales collapses are never encountered.” In the last
decades, the experimental research seems to confirm there is nothing like a “real collapse” suddenly
happening when measurement takes place. Unfortunately, as Dieks [23] also acknowledges: “The
evidence against collapses has not yet affected the textbook tradition, which has not questioned the
status of collapses as a mechanism of evolution alongside unitary Schro¨dinger dynamics.” We could
also add that the same phenomena is present when discussing about the notion of particle.
At safe distance from many approaches which assume a classical metaphysical standpoint when
analyzing QM —introducing implicitly or explicitly classical notions within the theory—, the logos
approach has been devised as an account of QM which stays close to the quantum formalism in the
most strict manner. This implies for us a suspicious attitude towards the (metaphysical) classical
notions of ‘system’, ‘state’ and ‘property’. Taking their place, we have created new non-classical
concepts which attempt to satisfy the features of the quantum formalism —and not the other way
around. According to the logos approach, QM talks about a potential realm which is independent
of actuality. There is no physical process which takes quantum superpositions into measurement
outcomes. QM talks about immanent powers with definite potentia, it does not talk about “small
particles”. From this standpoint, we have shown how through the aid of these notions we are
able to explain the distance between the objective representation provided by the theory and the
subjective measurements taking place hic et nunc in a lab [9] —dissolving in this way the infamous
measurement riddle. The notion of intensive power provides an objective reference to the Born
rule [5], escaping the orthodox reading in terms of collapses and measurement outcomes. This
new scheme has allowed us to provide an objective and intuitive grasp to the meaning of quantum
contextuality [13] and quantum superposition [7, 14].
5.2 Beyond Actualist Outcome Coding
According to our viewpoint, the main problem with the orthodox understanding of QM is that
the representation of physical reality has been completely scrambled with a naive understanding
of observability (for a detailed analysis see [7]). The infamous “collapse” scrambles the objective
quantum theoretical representation with subjective epistemic observations. Because of this, the
change in our (subjective) knowledge changes the theoretical description of (objective) reality itself.7
Hence, it is concluded that: “measurement changes the state of affairs in an uncontrollable manner.”
7This same scrambling takes place in the case of quantum contextuality and the so called “basis problem”. See for
a detailed analysis: [10].
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But, as we have argued extensively, this is not necessarily the end of the story. If we accept that
quantum probability is not making reference to measurement outcomes, but instead characterizes
an objective feature of the state of affairs represented by QM, then there is no need of considering
epistemic measurements within the theoretical representation. In such case, we can restore the
objective nature of the phenomena without the intromission of epistemic knowledge within the
description of objective quantum reality. The price we have payed willingly is to abandon the
atomist metaphysical picture grounded on systems described by definite valued (actual) properties
that can be observed with certainty (pure states).
Classically, the coding of a message implies no action at a distance. If we take two envelops
and put in one of them a ‘red’ piece of paper, and a ‘blue’ piece of paper in the other one; and we
then share the two envelops between two partners which travel to distant places like Buenos Aires
and Cagliari; the moment one of the partners in Buenos Aires opens the envelop, he will learn not
only which was the paper in his own envelop, he will also learn simultaneously what is the color
of the paper within the envelop of his partner in Italy. There is of course nothing spooky about
this. None of the pieces of paper traveled from Buenos Aires to Cagliari or vice versa, just because
one of the two partners opened the envelop. The state of affairs didn’t change. What changed,
when opening the envelope, was the knowledge of the state of affairs represented in classical terms.
However, this new knowledge did not transform in any way the actual state of affairs represented by
classical mechanics. The representation contained the whole set of possible actual state of affairs. As
Einstein and Spinoza demanded, the real situation cannot suddenly change, when a subject observes
what is inside one of the envelopes. The codification of actual correlations must be contained in the
theoretical description, and even though the gain of actual knowledge might filter possibilities that
did not become actual, it can never change the description provided by the theory. As we shall see
in the following section the main difference, according to the logos approach, between classical and
quantum codification of information (or entanglement) is not that in the quantum case things are
spooky, but that the type of coding is different: while classical entanglement codifies actual binary
information, QM is able to codify potential intensive information.
6 Quantum Entanglement as Relational Potential Coding
As discussed in the EPR paper, two powers can be related in terms of a definite value. In his papers,
Schro¨dinger also remarks that when considering X = x2−x1 or P = p2−p1, X and P might posses
a definite value as a whole, say X ′ and P ′, but their relata, x1, x2, p1 and p2 do not.
“[...] the result of measuring p1 serves to predict the result for p2 and vice versa [since P’ is
known]. But of course every one of the four observations in question, when actually performed,
disentangles the systems, furnishing each of them with an independent representative of its own.
A second observation, whatever it is and on whichever system it is executed, produces no further
change in the representative of the other system.
Yet since I can predict either x1 or p1 without interfering with system No. 1 and since
system No. 1, like a scholar in examination, cannot possibly know which of the two questions I
am going to ask it first: it so seems that our scholar is prepared to give the right answer to the
first question he is asked, anyhow. Therefore he must know both answers; which is an amazing
knowledge, quite irrespective of the fact that after having given his first answer our scholar is
invariably so disconcerted or tired out, that all the following answers are ‘wrong’.” [37, p. 555]
This relational aspect of QM is not shared by (reductionistic) classical theories grounded on set
theory and their underlying Boolean logic. What is difficult to accept from a classical metaphysical
viewpoint is that a relation can have a value without, at the same time, their relata possessing
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one. This first level of relationalism applies to actual observations. The result of the outcome x1 is
correlated (or anti-correlated) to the actual outcome x2 (and, of course, viceversa). All this is very
well known. However, this is not the only type of relation implied by QM. Quantum relationalism —
which will be addressed in detail in [17]— allows a potential coding of powers in two different levels.
While in the first level of representation we have definite or effective relations dealing with actual
measurements, in the second —most important— level we have an intensive relation between powers
which requires, at the epistemic level, a statistical type of analysis. It is this level, which we consider
to be the most characteristic of QM. Unfortunately, these relations have been overlooked by the
physics community embracing the positivist-empiricist obsession towards measurement outcomes
and their “common sense” description in terms of small unobservable particles.
Due to its restricted focus on measurement outcomes, it is only effective relations which have
been considered and analyzed by the community discussing quantum information processing. Let
us provide a definition of such relations:
Effective Relations: The relations determined by a difference of possible actual effectuations.
Effective relations discuss the possibility of an actualist definite coding. It involves the path from
intensive relations to definite correlated (or anti-correlated) outcomes. They are determined by a
binary valuation of the whole graph in which only one node is considered as true, while the rest are
considered as false.
Apart from the actualist coding of measurement otcomes, the potential coding making reference
to the potentia of correlated powers must be analyzed in a statistical manner. What needs to be
studied in detail is the way in which the potentia of such correlated powers is able to interact in
the potential realm. Intensive relations are, according to the logos approach, the true access-key to
quantum information processing.
Intensive Relations: The relations determined by the intensity of different powers. Intensive
relations imply the possibility of a potential intensive coding. They are determined by the correlation
of intensive valuations.
In the logos approach it is possible to consider, within a single graph, the entanglement of powers
and both intensive and effective relations. The quantum situation Ψ1|C1 exposes on the one hand the
statistical correlations between two powers, and on the other, the fact that every time we measure,
we will obtain correlated outcomes. This means that while intensive relations relate to intensive
valuations, effective relations relate to effective valuations.
Before we define mathematically the concept of effective valuation, let us recall the definitions
of intensive and binary valuations. An intensive valuation (or a PSA) is a map Ψ : G → [0, 1] and
a binary valuation is a local map ν : G → {0, 1} both compatible with the structure of the graph.
Recall that global binary valuations do not exist, but global intensive valuations do, see [13].
Definition 6.1 Let Ψ : G → [0, 1] be a PSA and let C ∈ G be a context. An effective valuation over
C = {Pi} is a random variable ν which takes Pk = 1 and the rest Pj = 0 (for all j 6= k).
Notice that the concept of effective valuation depends on a context. Now that we have the math-
ematical definition of effective valuation, let us give the mathematical definition of intensive and
effective relations.
Definition 6.2 Let Ψ1 and Ψ2 be two PSA. We say that Ψ1 and Ψ2 are related intensively if there
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exists an isomorphism τ making the following diagram commute
G1 τ //
Ψ1 !!
G2
Ψ2}}
[0, 1]
For example, in the next picture we can visualize the intensive relation between two PSA,
Example 6.3 Let’s give an example that serves for a better understanding of our definitions. As-
sume that we have a fair dice with faces {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. If we roll this dice on a table, when it
comes to rest each face has a probability of 1/6 of being shown on its upper surface. We can picture
this situation in the following way,
Notice that another fair dice, will have the same probabilities, hence according to our definitions,
both dice will be related intensively. However, the outcome of the first dice is independent to the
outcome of the second one. The intensive relation will not imply an effective relation. 
Definition 6.4 Let Ψ1 and Ψ2 be two PSA. We say that Ψ1 and Ψ2 are related effectively if every
effective valuation on G1 is correlated (or anti-correlated) to an effective valuation on G2. In other
words, if any effective valuation ν2 on G2 is given by τ(ν1) for some function τ and some effective
valuation ν1 on G1. If Ψ1 is related effectively to Ψ2, we picture a two-way arrow between the two
graphs.
For example, the following pictures denote effective relations, correlated and anti-correlated,
If the correlation is implicit, we picture effective relations in either of the following ways,
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Example 6.5 Continuing with our example of the two dice, assume that they are both glued to-
gether. Then, the outcome of one dice will obviously depend on the outcome of the other one; i.e.,
they will be related effectively.

Notice that if there exists an effective relation between two PSAs, then, consequently, there will
also exists an intensive relation between them. But the converse does not follow,
EFFECTIVE RELATIONS ⇒ INTENSIVE RELATIONS
INTENSIVE RELATIONS ; EFFECTIVE RELATIONS
Through the notions of intensive and effective relations we are now able to provide a new definition
of entanglement. This definition —contrary to the orthodox case— does not depend in any way on
the distinction between pure and mixed states nor makes any reference whatsoever to space-time
separability.
Definition 6.6 (Quantum Entanglement) Given Ψ1 and Ψ2 two PSAs, if Ψ1 and Ψ2 are related
intensively and effectively we say there exists quantum entanglement between Ψ1 and Ψ2.
This definition of entanglement provides an intuitive grasp related to the correlation between two
distant measuring set-ups. We also have the possibility to provide an intuitive non-spacial definition
of separability which relates to the lack of correlations between two distant screens.
Definition 6.7 (Relational Separability) Given Ψ1 and Ψ2 two PSAs, if Ψ1 and Ψ2 are not
related intensively nor effectively we say there is relational separability between Ψ1 and Ψ2.
It is interesting to notice that our definitions of potential coding in terms of intensive and
effective relations allows us to address a third possibility which considers the cases in which there
are only intensive relations involved.
Definition 6.8 (Intensive Correlation) Given Ψ1 and Ψ2 two PSAs, if Ψ1 and Ψ2 are related
intensively but not effectively we say there exists an intensive relation between Ψ1 and Ψ2.
The ontological account of QM in terms of intensive powers makes explicit that the most impor-
tant coding of quantum information lies in the intensive statistical level of analysis, not in the level
of single measurement outcomes. What needs to be codified is the relational potentia of powers,
not the specific outcomes. Adding to intensive relations, effective relations show that quantum re-
lations are not merely “statistical” in the classical sense, they are —as explicitly tested in Aspect’s
experiments— much stronger. Unfortunately, restricted by the almost exclusive reference to mea-
surement outcomes and atomist metaphysics, the field has limited itself to the analysis of the actual
measurement effectuations of “two entangled space-time separated particles”. This is not difficult
to understand given the widespread —either implicit or explicit— belief in “collapses” and the
strict reference to the actual realm of existence —either as referring to particles or to measurement
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outcomes. What we need to do now, according to the analysis provided by the logos approach,
is to advance towards the understanding of the codification of potentia. This must be done not
only in formal categorical terms but also in conceptual representational terms. Only together, the
mathematical formalism and physical concepts will be able to provide a truly objective anschaulich
content to the theory of quanta.
7 Restoring an Objective Account of Entanglement
Any trained physicist knows there is a huge gap between the work done with pen and paper by
theoretical physicists, and the one done by experimentalists, working in the lab with complex
instruments. Any student following a theoretical course in physics (e.g., electromagnetism) has felt
the sudden abysm he is confronted with when entering a lab to measure what he studied before (e.g.,
a field) in the classroom through equations, the acquisition of physical concepts and the analysis of
Gedankenexperiments. The reason for this huge gap is that the epistemic process of measurement
is not contained within the mathematical formalism of any physical theory. Physical theories do
not teach us how to actually measure, what instruments are required or how to build a set up.
Theories only provide us with a formal-conceptual representation of a state of affairs which can be
learnt in a classroom, period. After following a course on classical mechanics one can understand
its representation in terms of ‘interacting particles’ in space-time. After following a course on
electromagnetism a student will learn how to describe situations in terms of ‘interacting electro-
magnetic waves’. Theoretical courses in physics do not contain any deep technical explanation of
how to measure a ‘particle’ or a ‘field’. Theories simply do not come with a user’s manual explaining
the technical subtleties of how to measure things in the lab.
Another important point is that —contrary to the empiricist claim— courses always begin with
the theory, not with experiments. As Einstein [20, p. 175] remarked: “[...] it is the purpose of
theoretical physics to achieve understanding of physical reality which exists independently of the
observer, and for which the distinction between ‘direct observable’ and ‘not directly observable’
has no ontological significance” even though, of course, “the only decisive factor for the question
whether or not to accept a particular physical theory is its empirical success.” In particular, it
is only the theory which can tell you what can be measured, what the theory talks about. As
Heisenberg [28, p. 264] also made the point: “The history of physics is not only a sequence of
experimental discoveries and observations, followed by their mathematical description; it is also a
history of concepts. For an understanding of the phenomena the first condition is the introduction
of adequate concepts. Only with the help of correct concepts can we really know what has been
observed.” Physical theories provide an objective representation of a state of affairs detached form
the actions and choices of any subject (or agent). Subjects are —as Einstein correctly stressed—
always detached from theoretical representation.
It is due to this realist understanding of physics that both Schro¨dinger and Einstein remarked
that objective knowledge of a state of affairs cannot change after a known interaction. This is indeed,
the very precondition of realism and objective representation. Here, in order to avoid common
misunderstandings, the term ‘knowledge’ and the term ‘interaction’ should be clearly specified.
The theoretical knowledge of the objective representation of a state of affairs should not be confused
with the epistemic knowledge acquired by an agent within the lab. Exactly in the same sense, the
objective interaction described by the theoretical representation should not be confused with the
actual interaction that takes place in the lab hic et nunc when subjects perform measurements.
These two levels of analysis —the objective and the subjective— should not be scrambled.
Objective Theoretical Knowledge: The knowledge provided by an objective physical repre-
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sentation. The knowledge provided by the representation is always objective, in the sense that the
subject is completely detached from the represented state of affairs; and complete, in the sense that
it cannot be transformed by an epistemic gain of knowledge.
Subjective Empirical Knowledge: The knowledge collected by (empirical) subjects through
measurements within a lab. This praxis must presuppose a specific theoretical representation of
the state of affairs under analysis. The epistemic praxis of measuring a physical quantity is not
contained in the mathematical formalism. Epistemic knowledge can be complete or incomplete
depending of the technical capabilities and the empirical data collected by a subject (or agent).
Objective Theoretical Interaction: An interaction described within a theory. An ob-
jective interaction describes the way in which the elements —described within the theoretical
representation— relate between each other —within the representation. For example, a crash of
particles as described by classical mechanics or the interaction of two fields according to electro-
magnetism are cases of objective interactions.
Subjective Empirical Interaction: An interaction hic et nunc of a subject with objects that
is not necessarily described by a physical theory. For example, the conscious act of perceiving a
‘click’ in a detector.
Attempting to unscramble QM, one of the main points of the logos approach is that measurement
outcomes (or observations) —unlike in the orthodox positivist account of QM— are not considered
as part of the theory. Epistemic measurement results are not themselves part of the theoretical
representation provided by the orthodox formalism of QM [5, 7, 14]. By unscrambling the objective
theoretical level from the subjective empirical level we’ve been able to provide an anschaulich
objective account of both contextuality [13] and the measurement problem [9]. Following this line
of research we have provided a new definition of entanglement which restores Einstein’s objectivity
requirement of a detached observer. Intensive and effective relations can be addressed without
making any reference to measurement outcomes. Given a potential state of affairs, all correlations
can be objectively determined via the formalism alone. Quantum entanglement, which is nothing
but the correlations which exist within a potential state of affairs, can be defined in a completely
objective theoretical manner. Going against the orthodox Bohrian claim according to which our
knowledge (or observation) of a quantum system changes the systems itself, we have shown that
the potential state of affairs does not change when performing measurements. All possibilities —as
in the case of classical physics— are already contained within the theoretical description provided
by the orthodox formalism of QM.
8 The Anschaulich Content of Quantum Entanglement
From the logos standpoint, we need to answer the following question: What is quantum entangle-
ment in conceptual terms? Or in other words, how can we think intuitively about this physical
feature mathematically represented by the quantum formalism in terms of vectors and tensor prod-
ucts? Any adequate account of QM should be able to answer these questions in an intuitive manner.
In order to do so, we must abandon the orthodox fictional story of interconnected particles collapsing
their states in a super-luminous manner. This story does not make any sense. An adequate concep-
tual representation should be able to provide an anschaulich access and the possibility of thinking
about the phenomena described by the theory. We believe that the logos approach is able, thorough
the addition of new concepts, to produce such a conceptual insight to quantum entanglement. Let
us discuss this in some detail.
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We will discuss examples of entanglement provided by two different sports: football —as we all
know it— and United States’ football. Let us begin by football. Argentine Lionel Messi, Brazilian
Neymar da Silva Santos Ju´nior and Uruguayan Luis Suarez played together in season 2016 at an
amazing level. But what was taking place for this to happen? Apart from the fact that Messi,
Neymar and Suarez are three of the best players in the world, there are very good players which
simply don’t play well together. This phenomena is well known, the addition of great players doesn’t
necessarily create a great team. Indeed, the creation of a team is a difficult process which is not
at all understandable through a reductionistic type of logic. It is not the case that if you have
11 players with the capabilities of Messi, or Diego Armando Maradona, you will necessarily end
up with an amazing team. Unlike other sports, the powers of players within a football team are
highly contextual and relational. Each position within the field has a very specific need, a particular
demand. The powers of a player in one position, say, in the defense, are different from those required
in the attack. The aggregate of powers of a player in the left hand side of the field (like Neymar)
are different from those playing in the right hand side of the field (like Messi) or even in the middle
(like Suarez). Messi is the best player in the world, but in his specific position —which, of course,
turns out to be one of the most important positions within football due to its proximity to the
goal. However, we suspect that Messi would not be such an incredible player acting as a goalkeeper.
Messi simply doesn’t seem to have the specific powers required in order to act defending the goal in
an adequate manner. As we have discussed elsewhere, immanent powers are contextual existents.
It is due to this contextual feature of powers that a football team —as all football fans know— is
something truly difficult to conform. Producing a team implies a process of creating a balanced
and capable individual, namely, the team itself.
An interesting point for our analysis of quantum entanglement is the way in which the corre-
lations of teams are built up. The process through which a team learns how to play together; or
in other words, to “play as a team”. This means nothing else than to conform actions in a com-
pletely correlated manner, as a unity, as an individual. The answer to this question is obvious for
anyone who has played a sport: you get more correlated by simply playing together, by training,
by interacting through long periods of time. The more a team practices together, the more it will
be able to correlate in an adequate manner the relations between the different aggregates of powers
the team is composed of. The more a team trains together, the more they interact, the better
they will correlate the actual effectuations of powers the day of the game. The interaction between
the players creates something which we could also call “entanglement”; i.e., a potential coding of
possible moves of players within the football field.
The first type of relation is a definite potential coding which involves the preparation of very
specific moves within determined situations. These are called in Argentine “jugadas preparadas” —
which translated means “prepared moves”. Moves prepared in order to deal with corner kicks or free
kicks near scoring positions. But there is a much more interesting type of potential correlation to
which football fans —at least in Argentina— call “juegan de memoria”, which means that players
are able “to play by heart”. And this is the idea behind what we mean by intensive potential
coding. Intuitively, it means that some teams are so good in playing together that they act in a
completely correlated manner, and this is a kind of non-local behavior. The entanglement of the
powers of Messi, Suarez and Neymar gets more correlated the more the players interrelate, the more
they practice together, the more they know each other. It is only then, that they can acquire an
entangled relationship in which they are able to produce interrelated actions without a previous
written plan. For example, when Messi goes to the left, Suarez already knows that he has to go
to the right. When Neymar attacks by the left, Messi knows he has to go to the center. The
performances that we, football fans, witness every Sunday are highly correlated actions which are
not written beforehand. Most of these actions, unlike the case of U.S. football, are not previously
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determined. The intensive potential coding implies a truly potential correlated aggregate of actions
which are not written anywhere. And this is why there is a lot of “instant creation” within the
football field. And also, why football is so interesting. It is also interesting to notice that the
analysis of potential coding does not require effective actualizations. We know that the national
team of Argentina and Brazil are better football teams that those of Australia or New Zeland. But
this does not mean that Argentina and Brazil will always beat Australia and New Zeland.
U.S. football and baseball are much more strict regarding the possibilities of creation. The space
for the unknown action is much more restricted by the structure of the game. In U.S. football the
definite potential coding of possible moves has a much more important role than in football. In this
case the strategy in each situation becomes of outmost importance. This is because U.S. football
is a discrete set of situations. In each situation, the trainer must choose only one between a set of
already prepared possible actions. An action is performed and then a new action is required. There
is no continuity in the game and the trainer has to become a strategic leader. In this case, the U.S.
football player is more a soldier following orders than an artist creating a movement.
When we go to see a football match, we see how the entanglement encapsulated in potential
correlations is actualized during the game. There is nothing spooky about this. As there should be
nothing spooky about QM. The potential realm comprises the relations between intensive powers.
Potential reality cannot be encapsulated in terms of classical notions. Immanent intensive powers
are simply not space-time existents. To end, we might say that against the expectations of Einstein,
what is going on cannot be thought within the classical space-time representation; but against the
expectations of Bohr, QM can be explained with non-classical concepts in a truly objective manner.
Conclusion
In this paper we have reconsidered the notion of quantum entanglement from the perspective of the
logos categorical approach. We argued that the notions of pure state and separability, derived from
operational and metaphysical standpoints are superfluous for the mathematical formalism. Leaving
aside these superfluous distinctions we have proposed a new objective definition of entanglement in
terms of effective and intensive relations. We have argued that this definition provides an objec-
tive account of quantum potential coding, adding anschaulich content and erasing the supposedly
“spookiness” present within quantum correlations.
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